Lexis Nexis Antitrust Economics for Lawyers
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Written for partners, attorneys and associates at law firms in antitrust practice.
Antitrust economics is constantly evolving as a result of advances in economic analysis and research, and in response to developments in legal and regulatory proceedings. Antitrust law enforcement in turn generally reflects the main advances in antitrust economics. This book offers an accessible and clear exposition of the economics behind antitrust law, explaining several important developments in antitrust economics and discussing recent antitrust enforcement actions. Written by economic consultants and expert witnesses, the book discusses the economics of antitrust in a way that a lawyer, who may not have an economic background or degree, can understand. However, the text is not over-simplified, providing clearly explained formulae and equations. The book is broken down by merger analysis, monopoly and exclusion, and damages. The book stands alone in the field, of two competing texts, one is out of print, the other hasn’t been updated since a second edition in 2008. Antitrust Economics for Lawyers is MUCH more timely.
The authors are highly qualified consultants and expert witnesses specializing in antitrust economic matters.
The 2021 edition ISBN is 9781663319319.
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Table of contents
PART 1 MERGER ANALYSIS
CHAPTER 1 Market Definition and Multi-Product Firms in Merger Analysis
§ 1.01 Introduction
§ 1.02 The Hypothetical Monopolist Test
§ 1.03 Critical Loss Analysis
§ 1.04 Market Definition with Multi-Product Firms
§ 1.05 Conclusions
CHAPTER 2 Unilateral Effects of Horizontal Mergers
§ 2.01 Introduction
§ 2.02 General Economic Principles
§ 2.03 Quantitative Tools in Assessing Unilateral Effects
§ 2.04 Unilateral Effects Under Non-Price Competition
§ 2.05 Conclusions
CHAPTER 3 Coordinated Effects in Merger Analysis
§ 3.01 Introduction
§ 3.02 The Number of Competitors
§ 3.03 Supplier Asymmetries and Industry Mavericks
§ 3.04 Opportunities to Disrupt Coordination
§ 3.05 Conclusions
CHAPTER 4 Price Collusion Using Artificial Intelligence
§ 4.01 Introduction
§ 4.02 What Does AI Do?
§ 4.03 Does AI Prediction of Demand Facilitate Collusion?
§ 4.04 Can AIs Learn to Collude?
§ 4.05 Responses to AI Collusion
§ 4.06 Conclusion
CHAPTER 5 The Economics of Monopsony
§ 5.01 Introduction
§ 5.02 Key Economic Concepts
§ 5.03 Basic Monopsony Economics
§ 5.04 Extending the Monopsony Analysis to More General Assumptions
§ 5.05 Economic Rents and Monopsony Power
§ 5.06 Conclusions
CHAPTER 6 Analyzing Merger Effects on Input Prices When Prices Are Negotiated
§ 6.01 Introduction
§ 6.02 Review of the Nash Bargaining Model
§ 6.03 Merger Effects on Input Prices When Prices Are Negotiated
§ 6.04 Implications for the Analysis of Competitive Effects
PART 2 MONOPOLY AND EXCLUSION
CHAPTER 7 Economics of Distribution and Franchising and Their Legal Implications
§ 7.01 Overview of the Economic Nature of Distribution Arrangements
§ 7.02 Economic Analysis of Distribution
§ 7.03 Potential Procompetitive Efficiencies from Vertical Restraints
§ 7.04 Potential Anticompetitive Effects from Vertical Restraints
§ 7.05 Economic Characteristics of Franchise Systems
§ 7.06 Conclusion
CHAPTER 8 Distinguishing Between Market Power and Monopoly Power in a Section 2 Exclusion Case
§ 8.01 Introduction
§ 8.02 The Simple Economics of Monopoly Power
§ 8.03 Market Power in Oligopolies
§ 8.04 An Economic Approach to the Legal Definition of Monopoly Power
§ 8.05 Markups and Market Shares May Not Be Reliable Predictors of Market Power
§ 8.06 Monopoly Power and Causation
CHAPTER 9 Bundling
§ 9.01 Introduction
§ 9.02 The Benefits of Bundling
§ 9.03 Two Representative Cases
§ 9.04 Anticompetitive Bundling
§ 9.05 Price-Cost Tests for Bundled Discounts
§9.06 Bundling on Digital Platforms
CHAPTER 10 Contracts That Reference Rivals
§ 10.01 Introduction
§ 10.02 Identifying CRRs
§ 10.03 Competitive Effects of CRRs
§ 10.04 Exclusive Dealing and Market-Share Discounts
§ 10.05 MFNs
§ 10.06 Network Contracting
§ 10.07 Conclusion
PART 3 DAMAGES
CHAPTER 11 Estimating Damages in Collusion Cases
§ 11.01 Introduction
§ 11.02 The Economics of Damages from Collusion
§ 11.03 Building A Model for the Damages Analysis
§ 11.04 Estimating Damages Using Econometric Models
CHAPTER 12 Class Certification
§ 12.01 Introduction
§ 12.02 First Generation Statistical Models Used in Class Certification
§ 12.03 Statistical Models with Individualized Impact Results
§ 12.04 Conclusion
CHAPTER 13 Endogeneity Problems in Empirical Analyses of Antitrust and Competition
§ 13.01 Introduction
§ 13.02 What is Endogeneity?
§ 13.03 Typical Sources of Endogeneity
§ 13.04 Solutions for Endogeneity
§ 13.05 Five Examples Relevant for Antitrust Matters
INDEX
