Antitrust Economics for Lawyers

The complex economics of antitrust matters discussed in a language lawyers speak and understand.
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2021 Edition
ISBN: 9781663319319
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Written for partners, attorneys and associates at law firms in antitrust practice.

Antitrust economics is constantly evolving as a result of advances in economic analysis and research, and in response to developments in legal and regulatory proceedings. Antitrust law enforcement in turn generally reflects the main advances in antitrust economics. This book offers an accessible and clear exposition of the economics behind antitrust law, explaining several important developments in antitrust economics and discussing recent antitrust enforcement actions. Written by economic consultants and expert witnesses, the book discusses the economics of antitrust in a way that a lawyer, who may not have an economic background or degree, can understand. However, the text is not over-simplified, providing clearly explained formulae and equations. The book is broken down by merger analysis, monopoly and exclusion, and damages. The book stands alone in the field, of two competing texts, one is out of print, the other hasn’t been updated since a second edition in 2008. Antitrust Economics for Lawyers is MUCH more timely.

The authors are highly qualified consultants and expert witnesses specializing in antitrust economic matters.

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Table of contents

PART 1 MERGER ANALYSIS

CHAPTER 1 Market Definition and Multi-Product Firms in Merger Analysis

§ 1.01 Introduction
§ 1.02 The Hypothetical Monopolist Test
§ 1.03 Critical Loss Analysis
§ 1.04 Market Definition with Multi-Product Firms
§ 1.05 Conclusions

CHAPTER 2 Unilateral Effects of Horizontal Mergers
§ 2.01 Introduction
§ 2.02 General Economic Principles
§ 2.03 Quantitative Tools in Assessing Unilateral Effects
§ 2.04 Unilateral Effects Under Non-Price Competition
§ 2.05 Conclusions

CHAPTER 3 Coordinated Effects in Merger Analysis
§ 3.01 Introduction
§ 3.02 The Number of Competitors
§ 3.03 Supplier Asymmetries and Industry Mavericks
§ 3.04 Opportunities to Disrupt Coordination
§ 3.05 Conclusions

CHAPTER 4 The Economics of Monopsony
§ 4.01 Introduction
§ 4.02 Key Economic Concepts
§ 4.03 Basic Monopsony Economics
§ 4.04 Extending the Monopsony Analysis to More General Assumptions
§ 4.05 Economic Rents and Monopsony Power
§ 4.06 Conclusions

CHAPTER 5 Analyzing Merger Effects on Input Prices When Prices Are Negotiated
§ 5.01 Introduction
§ 5.02 Review of the Nash Bargaining Model
§ 5.03 Merger Effects on Input Prices When Prices Are Negotiated
§ 5.04 Implications for the Analysis of Competitive Effects

PART 2 MONOPOLY AND EXCLUSION

CHAPTER 6 Economics of Distribution and Franchising and Their Legal Implications

§ 6.01 Overview of the Economic Nature of Distribution Arrangements
§ 6.02 Economic Analysis of Distribution
§ 6.03 Potential Procompetitive Efficiencies from Vertical Restraints
§ 6.04 Potential Anticompetitive Effects from Vertical Restraints
§ 6.05 Economic Characteristics of Franchise Systems
§ 6.06 Conclusion

CHAPTER 7 Distinguishing Between Market Power and Monopoly Power in a Section 2 Exclusion Case
§ 7.01 Introduction
§ 7.02 The Simple Economics of Monopoly Power
§ 7.03 Market Power in Oligopolies
§ 7.04 An Economic Approach to the Legal Definition of Monopoly Power
§ 7.05 Markups and Market Shares May Not Be Reliable Predictors of Market Power
§ 7.06 Monopoly Power and Causation

CHAPTER 8 Bundling
§ 8.01 Introduction
§ 8.02 The Benefits of Bundling
§ 8.03 Two Representative Cases
§ 8.04 Anticompetitive Bundling
§ 8.05 Price-Cost Tests for Bundled Discounts

CHAPTER 9 Contracts That Reference Rivals
§ 9.01 Introduction
§ 9.02 Identifying CRRs
§ 9.03 Competitive Effects of CRRs
§ 9.04 Exclusive Dealing and Market-Share Discounts
§ 9.05 MFNs
§ 9.06 Network Contracting
§ 9.07 Conclusion

PART 3 DAMAGES AND ESTIMATION METHODS

CHAPTER 10 Estimating Damages in Collusion Cases

§ 10.01 Introduction
§ 10.02 The Economics of Damages from Collusion
§ 10.03 Building A Model for the Damages Analysis
§ 10.04 Estimating Damages Using Econometric Models

CHAPTER 11 Class Certification
§ 11.01 Introduction
§ 11.02 First Generation Statistical Models Used in Class Certification
§ 11.03 Statistical Models with Individualized Impact Results
§ 11.04 Conclusion

CHAPTER 12 Endogeneity Problems in Empirical Analyses of Antitrust and Competition
§ 12.01 Introduction
§ 12.02 What is Endogeneity?
§ 12.03 Typical Sources of Endogeneity
§ 12.04 Solutions for Endogeneity
§ 12.05 Five Examples Relevant for Antitrust Matters

INDEX