PART 1 MERGER ANALYSIS
CHAPTER 1 Market Definition and Multi-Product Firms in Merger Analysis
§ 1.01 Introduction
§ 1.02 The Hypothetical Monopolist Test
§ 1.03 Critical Loss Analysis
§ 1.04 Market Definition with Multi-Product Firms
§ 1.05 Conclusions
CHAPTER 2 Unilateral Effects of Horizontal Mergers
§ 2.01 Introduction
§ 2.02 General Economic Principles
§ 2.03 Quantitative Tools in Assessing Unilateral Effects
§ 2.04 Unilateral Effects Under Non-Price Competition
§ 2.05 Conclusions
CHAPTER 3 Coordinated Effects in Merger Analysis
§ 3.01 Introduction
§ 3.02 The Number of Competitors
§ 3.03 Supplier Asymmetries and Industry Mavericks
§ 3.04 Opportunities to Disrupt Coordination
§ 3.05 Conclusions
CHAPTER 4 Antitrust and Merger Enforcement in the AI Era
§ 4.01 Introduction
§ 4.02 Antitrust and Competition in the Generative AI Space
§ 4.03 The Impact of AI on Merger Review
§ 4.04 Effect of Algorithms and AI on the Likelihood of Post-Merger
Coordinated Effects
CHAPTER 5 The Economics of Monopsony
§ 5.01 Introduction
§ 5.02 Key Economic Concepts
§ 5.03 Basic Monopsony Economics
§ 5.04 Extending the Monopsony Analysis to More General Assumptions
§ 5.05 Economic Rents and Monopsony Power
§ 5.06 Conclusions
CHAPTER 6 Analyzing Merger Effects on Input Prices When Prices Are Negotiated
§ 6.01 Introduction
§ 6.02 Review of the Nash Bargaining Model
§ 6.03 Merger Effects on Input Prices When Prices Are Negotiated
§ 6.04 Implications for the Analysis of Competitive Effects
PART 2 MONOPOLY AND EXCLUSION
CHAPTER 7 Common Ownership
§ 7.01 Introduction
§ 7.02 Measurement of Common Ownership
§ 7.03 Increase of Common Ownership in Recent Decades
§ 7.04 Empirical Evidence Pointing to Anticompetitive Effects of Common
Ownership
§ 7.05 Mechanisms of Common Ownership
§ 7.06 Beyond Horizontal Product Market Effects of Common Ownership
§ 7.07 Common Ownership in Antitrust Practice
§ 7.08 Conclusion
§ 7.09 Technical Appendix
CHAPTER 8 Economics of Distribution and Franchising and Their Legal Implications
§ 8.01 Overview of the Economic Nature of Distribution Arrangements
§ 8.02 Economic Analysis of Distribution
§ 8.03 Potential Procompetitive Efficiencies from Vertical Restraints
§ 8.04 Potential Anticompetitive Effects from Vertical Restraints
§ 8.05 Economic Characteristics of Franchise Systems
§ 8.06 Conclusion
CHAPTER 9 Distinguishing Between Market Power and Monopoly Power in a Section 2 Exclusion Case
§ 9.01 Introduction
§ 9.02 The Simple Economics of Monopoly Power
§ 9.03 Market Power in Oligopolies
§ 9.04 An Economic Approach to the Legal Definition of Monopoly Power
§ 9.05 Markups and Market Shares May Not Be Reliable Predictors of Market
Power
§ 9.06 Monopoly Power and Causation
CHAPTER 10 Bundling
§ 10.01 Introduction
§ 10.02 The Benefits of Bundling
§ 10.03 Two Representative Cases
§ 10.04 Anticompetitive Bundling
§ 10.05 Price-Cost Tests for Bundled Discounts
§ 10.06 Bundling on Digital Platforms
CHAPTER 11 Contracts That Reference Rivals
§ 11.01 Introduction
§ 11.02 Identifying CRRs
§ 11.03 Competitive Effects of CRRs
§ 11.04 Exclusive Dealing and Market-Share Discounts
§ 11.05 MFNs
§ 11.06 Network Contracting
§ 11.07 Conclusion
CHAPTER 12 Antitrust and Standard Essential Patents
§ 12.01 Background
§ 12.02 Jurisdictional Differences in Resolving Frand Disputes
§ 12.03 Global Issues in SEP Licensing
PART 3 DAMAGES
CHAPTER 13 Estimating Damages in Collusion Cases
§ 13.01 Introduction
§ 13.02 The Economics of Damages from Collusion
§ 13.03 Building a Model for the Damages Analysis
§ 13.04 Estimating Damages Using Econometric Models
CHAPTER 14 Class Certification
§ 14.01 Introduction
§ 14.02 First Generation Statistical Models Used in Class Certification
§ 14.03 Statistical Models with Individualized Impact Results
§ 14.04 Conclusion
CHAPTER 15 Endogeneity Problems in Empirical Analyses of Antitrust and
Competition
§ 15.01 Introduction
§ 15.02 What is Endogeneity?
§ 15.03 Typical Sources of Endogeneity
§ 15.04 Solutions for Endogeneity
§ 15.05 Five Examples Relevant for Antitrust Matters
INDEX